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'Dicta Observes
LEGISLATURE VS. JUDICIARY
A bill has been introduced in the Massachusetts' Legis-
lature providing that an attorney of record who is actually
engaged in the trial of a cause in any of the courts of the
commonwealth or before an auditor or master appointed by
any of said courts or before the federal courts in the common-
wealth shall not be required to proceed to the trial of any
other cause so long as he is thus actually engaged in such trial.
INSURANCE-WARRANTIES
Statutes have been passed in more than thirty-four states
substantially making warranties in insurance policies nothing
more than representations. The statutes may be placed in five
classes: (1) those expressly making warranties representa-
tions, the typical language being "all statements made by the
insured shall in the absence of fraud be deemed representations
and not warrantieS;" (2) those stating that "the misrepre-
sentations must relate to some matter material to the risk,"
or that "the matter represented must have actually contrib-
uted to the contingency or event on which the policy is to
become due and payable," in order to avoid the policy; (3)
those requiring concurrence of materiality and fraud for
avoidance of a policy; (4) those stating that either ma-
teriality or fraud will avoid a policy; (5) those providing
that the certificate of the medical examiner shall estop the in-
surer from contesting the policy because of ill-health of the
applicant. This would seem to have the effect of making in-
operative any statement of the insured as to his state of health.
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JUSTICE DELAYED IS JUSTICE DENIED
According to the issue of The Justinian (Brooklyn Law
School) of April 6, 1933, it takes four years to reach a case
on the general jury calendar in the City Court of Kings Coun-
ty in Brooklyn.
The Supreme Court, New York County, is more than
two years behind in its jury trials.
The Kings County Supreme Court is three and one-half
years behind, while Queens County is more than two years
behind and Bronx is about sixteen months behind.
The City Court of New York County is three years be-
hind in its regular calendar and about fourteen months be-
hind in its commercial calendar.
The City Court of Bronx is three and one-half years
behind in its regular calendar. In the Municipal Courts of
the Bronx the jury calendar averages about one and one-half
years behind. The Municipal Courts in Brooklyn the jury
calendar is one and one-half to two and one-half years be-
hind, the average being more than two years.
THERE Is ONLY ONE CHICAGO
Editorial comment has heretofore been made in these
columns (American Bar Association Journal, February,
1933) on the pioneering work, not as to the ethical principles
involved but as to the application of those principles to a
novel state of facts, which has been done by the Chicago Bar
Association in its proceedings against certain lawyers em-
ployed by the Sanitary District of Chicago during the period
between July 1, 1925, and December 31, 1928.
The information against the respondents was filed by
the Chicago Bar Association by leave of the Supreme Court
of Illinois in 1930, and it charged them with malfeasance in
office as members of the Bar of that Court. The malfeasance
charged in the case of most of the respondents consisted in
taking salaries from the District without rendering adequate
services therefor.
The Supreme Court referred the matter to a Master to
take proof and report his conclusions of law and fact. It has
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now acted on that report. The decision, which was handed
down by Mr. Justice Stone, is a lengthy one and goes into the
cases of the respondents separately, and imposes discipline in
a large majority of them. It is an emphatic assertion of the
duty of a lawyer in public office to treat his client, the public,
as honestly and fairly as he is expected to treat a private
client. No matter what the political traditions of the way of
doing business may be, his professional obligations remain
and must control in any professional connection, public or
private.
ON THE OTHER HAND-
It appears from the Ohio Bar Association Report, April
10, 1933, that Trumbull County attorneys will object to at-
torneys from outside the county who file actions for Trum-
bull plaintiffs. The Trumbull Bar Association at a meet-
ing authorized further committee work to draft plans of
barring non-resident attorneys from filing suits in the county.
One proposal is to have court ruling requiring every out-of-
town attorney to employ resident co-council. Another method
suggested is to attack the problem through secret interviews
with the plaintiffs. (Italics ours.) Thomas W. Evans, re-
porting a probe into record of petitions filed, declared that
checkup covering several years, showed 51 per cent of the
personal injury suits were filed by Mahoning County at-
torneys, 46 per cent by Trumbull attorneys, and three per
cent by attorneys from outside both Trumbull and Mahon-
ing Counties. Arner B. Clark served as chairman at the meet-
ing. Brief addresses were offered by T. W. Evans and Jay
Buchwalter on proposed legislation.
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THE TAX REFUND STATUTE SPEAKS
(As told to Erl H. Ellis of the Denver Bar)
SAM known casually to attorneys as Section 7447 of the
Compiled Laws of Colorado of 1921. But I want you
to know me better, for I think I have enough of a history
now to lay claim to being quite a distinguishea character. I
wish we statutes were not treated like criminals by you
lawyers and always designated by a number. Behind every
criminal lies a human interest story. Behind many a statute
lies a tale of conflicting ideas and often of class struggles.
'Way back in 1870 I was born in the territorial legisla-
ture, in the following language:
"In all cases where any person shall pay any taxes .... that
shall thereafter be found to be erroneous or illegal . . . the board
of county commissioners shall refund the same without abatement or
discount to the taxpayer."
Since then I have not suffered any serious amputations
so my appearance has not changed much through the years.
But my "inside" story is what I want to tell you. Of course,
I cannot tell you too accurately of the circumstances of my
birth, but I imagine that it was argued to the legislature in
1870 that, inasmuch as the county was collecting taxes for
the territory and might collect taxes for other subdivisions of
the government, and as there might be cases where illegal taxes
would be collected, it ought to be settled just who should
refund these illegal taxes to the taxpayer. It was natural,
therefore, for the legislature to declare that the county itself,
having been made the collector of all taxes, should in turn be
the official "refunder."
I have often wondered what this paternalistic legisla-
ture of mine meant by the word "found." They were saying
that an illegal tax should be refunded by the county, but how
was the illegality to be determined? Did it simply mean that
the taxpayer discovered that he had paid an illegal tax, or did
it mean that some court would first have to make a legal
finding of illegality?
You will remember that in those days the lawyers in
the state were following common law procedure pretty closely.
At common law the taxpayer had the established right of
suing for illegal taxes, if the taxpayer had paid the money
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involuntarily and under protest, and the taxpayer had to
further show that the particular party made defendant still
had the tax money. So the lawyers in those days might well
have concluded that the only purpose in mind when I was
written was to say that the county commissioners should al-
ways be the defendants and that the plaintiff taxpayer no
longer had to prove that the county had all of the tax money
collected. You will find in 2 Colo. 628, and in 3 Colo. 349,
two actions in assumpsit evidently based on the theory, in
the '70s, that the taxpayer's right was still a common law
right despite my existence. It was not until about 1890 (see
15 Colo. 90) that the first reported action was brought which
seemed to be based on the theory that through me there was
created a new cause of action and an entirely new statutory
procedure for the refunding of taxes.
Now, peculiarly, my experiences have been even more in-
teresting in equity than in law. You might imagine that a
court of equity would have little interest in my simple person
as apparently I only have to do with a legal proceeding
against the county for the recovery of money illegally exacted
by the county. But you must remember that the taxpayer
often feels that the imposition of an illegal tax is a very great
burden and the taxpayer is not a bit anxious to turn over
this money to the government and take the chance of recover-
ing it back. I was not very well known to the taxpayer in
the early days, and he naturally did not place a great deal
of confidence in me.
This led the taxpayer to go to a court of equity and seek
an injunction against the collector of taxes. But immediately
the equity court asked the taxpayer, do you not have an ade-
quate remedy at law?-and that is where I naturally came
into the picture. The equity court, as early as 1879 (4 Colo.
546 and 580), looked me over and said that I afforded "a
full and adequate remedy at law." From then on I have taken
the leading role in a good many decisions in injunction cases
decided by the Supreme Court of Colorado and by the Federal
Courts.
It has never been very clearly explained to me just how
I happened to assume such a stellar role, but I have necessarily
reached the decision that the equity judges felt that the old
common law right of assumpsit was not an adequate remedy
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at law because of the various conditions and difficulties sur-
rounding recovery thereunder. So from the very first the
courts looked upon me with a favorable eye and decided that
my purpose was not merely to define the proper party de-
fendant in an assumpsit action but that through me there was
created a completely new statutory right to test the legality of
all kinds of taxing statutes and procedure. Let me emphasize
this by telling you, with due modesty, what some of the
courts have said about me.
I will cite first the case of Singer Sewing Machine Co.
vs. Benedict (1913), 229 U. S. 481, as a clear statement of
the idea that the Colorado statute, in imposing upon the
county commissioners "the duty of refunding, without abate-
ment or discount, taxes which have been paid and are found
to be illegal," also thereby "confers upon the taxpayer a cor-
relative right to enforce that duty by an action at law." Now
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals did not at first realize
my potentialities and importance (see 173 Fed. 456), but
after the United States Supreme Court had spoken so defi-
nitely the Eighth Circuit quickly joined in singing my praises
in the cases of Union Pacific vs. Weld County, 217 Fed. 540,
and 222 Fed. 651. You will pardon this further quotation
which refers to me:
"Its object was to give an action at law for the recovery of sums
paid or account of invalid taxes in place of a suit in equity to restrain
their collection. . . . It is a mistake to view this statute as relating
to procedure only. It creates a right in favor of the aggrieved taxpayer.
. . . The taxpayer is given the remedy of paying his taxes and recover-
ing back any sum which the court shall hold to have been illegally
exacted. . . . A legal remedy has been substituted by statute for the
remedy in equity. . . . This is substantive law. It gives a new right.
That statute has nothing to do directly with the law of procedure.
It is remedial only in the sense of a substantive law which cor-
rects a known evil. . . . The statute of Colorado simply grants to a
property owner the right to have any sum exacted from him by an
illegal tax refunded."
Perhaps it might be suspected that the Federal Courts
had been a little presumptuous in declaring so explicitly just
what was my place and meaning in the Colorado law, but if
so, it developed that the Colorado Supreme Court had exactly




"Recovery is sought in this case under a specific and unqualified
statute commanding a refund by the county of every erroneous or illegal
tax paid, and does not involve the general law on that subject.
The action here is based upon a statutory right." (From 63 Colo. 438.)
"This court has repeatedly construed this section as giving him
(the taxpayer) a cause of action against the county for any tax, the
validity of which he, at that time, has the right to question." (From
64 Colo. 268.)
"The true meaning of Sec. 5750 (my number in 1908) is to
impose a liability upon the county in favor of a taxpayer who pays
an illegal or erroneous tax, and a corresponding duty upon the commis-
sioners, as agents of such county, to refund the same. The effect of the
new' section (a tax commission statute) in nowise removes that liabili-
ty, or deprives the taxpayer of his right to maintain a suit therefor."
(From 65 Colo. 166.)
You may feel that the courts have been pretty nice to
me in thus defining my dignity and importance but there is
naturally some limitation to my powers. You will notice that
the legislature has said that if any tax is due to an erroneous
assessment or to an improper levy or to clerical errors, then
the tax must be refunded. Now the courts have been pre-
sented with two general types of complaint about erroneous
taxation. In the one case the taxpayer may claim that there is
some legal question as to the right to levy any tax upon his
property or as to the right to levy a tax for a specific purpose.
This involves a true illegality of the tax. On the other hand
many taxpayers have complained that the assessment of their
property was too high. This latter sort of complanit involved
simply the judgment of the assessor in fixing the appraisal
of the property for tax purposes.
My idea is that I am concerned chiefly in those cases in-
volving true illegality and that an erroneous tax is not much
different from an illegal tax as far as I am concerned. (See 51
Fed. (2d) 703.) I am inclined to say to my taxpayer friends
that they can rely upon me if they have a real case of illegality
and that they can pay the tax and then sue the county to re-
cover back the same without worrying very much about the
so-called administrative remedies. But if the taxpayer is really
fundamentally complaining that his assessment is too high
and there is involved fundamentally simply the judgment of
the assessor in making the appraisal then I must say that I am
not of very great help and that certainly every effort should
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be made to obtain relief from the various administrative
bodies, including the assessor, the county commissioners, the
tax commission, and perhaps even other bodies. It may be
that after exhausting all such remedies a court would in some
instances let the taxpayer then go into court in reliance upon
my provisions and urge illegality on the theory that the as-
sessment was so high as to be lawfully erroneous, or that the
various reviewing bodies had acted arbitrarily, or something
of that sort. (For further illustrations see 15 Colo. 90 and
18 Pac. (2d) 323.)
The poor taxpayer at common law, and at present in a
great many states, had and has a great difficulty in getting
taxes paid back because the taxpayer had to show that he
had not made a voluntary payment of the tax. The decisions
of most of the states are full of erudite discussions of whether
or not the tax payment was or was not voluntary. I feel that
I have made such discussions in Colorado entirely irrelevant.
Perhaps I cannot cite a case from the Colorado Supreme Court
definitely passing on this point but you will, I hope, agree
with me that it has been well established that through me was
created an entirely new self-contained statutory right and so
why should it be assumed that some old common law weak-
ness impairs my constitution. The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals (in 222 Fed. 651) has passed upon this point in
the following language:
"In the absence of a statute, the payment of a tax, with few
exceptions, is held to be voluntary and, though the tax may be invalid,
the money paid cannot be recovered. This is especially true of taxes
upon real property. The process by which such taxes are collected is
so gradual and offers so many opportunities of resistance that the courts
have almost uniformly held that there can be no such duress as to
such taxes as to render their payment involuntary. The statute of Colo-
rado here under consideration changes that law."
Again I might warn you that I operate on a cash basis
and that when I talk about a person paying a tax I mean a
real payment in money. I am sorry, but I cannot go on to the
scrip basis or anything of that sort even in these days. One
of my friends got into a little trouble (see 15 C. A. 274)
trying to claim that an uncashed check was a payment of a
tax. But if the county takes the taxpayer's property and sells
it that is just the same as the taxpayer paying the tax in
money and the taxpayer can rely upon me for recovery; even
though the county treasurer embezzles the money from the
tax sale. (See 63 Colo. 438.)
And somewhat along the same line I am forced to re-
mind those who purchase at tax sales that they are tax pur-
chasers and not taxpayers and if they pay money at a tax
sale for land being sold under an illegal taxing statute they
cannot rely upon me to get their money back for them from
the county for I protect only taxpayers. (See 14 Pac. (2d)
493.)
Of course you will not fail to keep in mind that while
the county may collect taxes for the state, the school districts,
the cities and the towns as well as for the county, neverthe-
less if any of those taxes are illegal the county is the proper
party defendant and you only have to bring one suit to get
all parts of the illegal tax back. (See 217 Fed. 540, and 247
U. S. 282.) The Colorado Supreme Court has said (65
Colo. 166) about a Greeley bank: "Therefore, in a single
action at law under the statute, it could protect itself and its
shareholders."
A good many of my friends who support the public
treasury have asked me about the necessity of paying their
taxes "under protest" if they want to later rely upon me in
bringing a suit for the recovery back of the illegal tax. My
inclination has been to point out to such inquirers that I am
in nowise qualified in my statutory definition, that that
statute does not say that the tax must have been paid under
protest but says simply that it must be an illegal tax, that this
idea of paying under protest is probably a "hang over" from
the days when the taxpayer had to prove that his tax was
paid absolutely involuntarily, and therefore I have not felt
that if the taxpayer did not "pay under protest" he had lost
his rights. I think there is some suggestion of this in the case
in 35 Colo. 490, because there a part of the assessments were
said to have been paid without protest and yet the court seems
to have allowed recovery without comment as to that possible
defense. I might say further that the county is not harmed
by any lack of notice of the contention of the taxpayer that
the tax is claimed to be illegal because the county will prob-
ably distribute the money out to the state, school districts and
municipalities anyway and then if there is a later recovery
the county can charge back the money it has had to refund
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against these other departments of the government on later
distributions. (See 217 Fed. 540.)
However, it is quite customary and perhaps the better
practice to give the county some notice at the time the tax
is paid that the taxpayer considers the exaction illegal.
You might also think of this duty of the county to re-
fund the tax as creating in the taxpayer a claim against the
county and that therefore the taxpayer should file a claim or
demand for repayment before starting suit inasmuch as one
of my fellows (Section 8697) requires that all claims and
demands against the county shall be presented for audit and
allowance before any action in court shall be maintainable
thereon. This matter has been definitely settled by the Colo-
rado Supreme Court in the case of Boyer Bros. vs. Routt
County, 87 Colo. 275, the court holding that the filing of a
claim was unnecessary. When the taxpayer relies upon me he
has more than an ordinary claim. He has a real right to go
immediately to the judicial branch of the government and
say to the county, "Refund this most iniquitous tax."
But I try to be fair to both sides. I say that the refund
shall be without abatement or discount of the amount paid in
and found illegal, but I also am not permitted by the court
to force the county to pay any interest on the tax money.
(See 75 Colo. 131.)
Now I hope that I have succeeded in justifying my own
egotistic feeling that I am an "interesting statute." As further
justification of my feeling of self-importance I could give you
a list of about twenty-five decisions of the Supreme Court of
Colorado in which the action was based upon my existence.
WE THANK YOU (Dictaphun please note)
Mr. Dunbar F. Carpenter of the Boston Bar, a classmate
at Harvard of Mr. Peter H. Holme of the Denver Bar, in a
recent letter to Mr. Holme states:
"As editor of the Bar Bulletin published by the Bar Association
of the City of Boston, I receive a good many exchanges. One of the
best of the law journals which come to me is your "Dicta." I am
reminded of this because I find on my desk this morning the April
issue. Perhaps it is because I have a particular affection for Colorado
and Colorado lawyers, but at any rate "Dicta" interests me more than
any other journal. It avoids the cut and dried style of the ordinary
law journal, and is full of what might be termed 'human interest.'
(We have applied for a substantial increase in salary.)
202
1933 AMENDMENT TO THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
By Ivar Wingren of the Denver Bar)ON March 3, 1933, President Hoover signed the bill
providing for amendments to the Bankruptcy Act.
This amendment is composed of four sections:
Section 73-Granting the Bankruptcy Courts original jurisdic-
tion in proceedings for the relief of debtors;
Section 74-Compositions and extensions;
Section 75-Agricultural compositions and extensions;
Section 76-Providing for extending the obligations of persons
secondarily liable to those granted extensions under Sections 74 and 75.
Section 77-Reorganization of railroads engaged in interstate
commerce.
Without attempting to go into too much detail, it may
be said generally that Section 74 relating to compositions and
extensions applies only to persons as distinguished from cor-
porations.
Under Section 74 the procedure is generally as follows:
The individual files his petition for extension or com-
position, files his schedules, has a meeting called of his credi-
tors, a custodian or receiver appointed; the custodian or re-
ceiver-not the Referee-promptly calls a first meeting of
creditors-unless none is appointed, in which case it becomes
the duty of the Court to do so-setting out in the notice a
brief statement of the terms offered by the debtor to his credi-
tors, and a list of the secured creditors and the names of 15
of the largest unsecured creditors; an examination of the
debtor at the first meeting; an application for confirmation of
the composition or extension offered; confirmation of the
composition or extension or dismissal. Extensions under this
Act may extend the time of payment on either or both secured
and unsecured debts, the security for which is in the actual or
constructive possession of the debtor or of the custodian or
receiver; and may provide for a period of payment to be made
during the period of extension as between secured and un-
secured creditors. Under this section a claim for future rent
is a provable debt.
In case the debtor fails to carry out the terms of the com-
position offered, or the extension granted, he is adjudicated a
bankrupt. Except that no order of adjudication can be en-
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tered against a wage-earner or farmer unless the wage-earner
or farmer consents.
The Old Law as to the proceedings, except as otherwise
provided, leaves the jurisdiction and powers of the Court,
and the powers and duties of its officers, and their fees; and
the duties of debtors, and the rights and liabilities of creditors,
and the jurisdiction of the appellate courts, the same as
though an adjudication was had under the Old Law.
It further provides that Judges of Courts of Bankruptcy
shall appoint sufficient Referees to sit in convenient places to
expedite the proceedings, which is a re-establishment of the
Old Law, as found in Section 37, with slightly different
wording.
Section 76, which is to remain in effect for five years,
relates only to farmers-and to dirt farmers at that-the Act
defines the term "farmer" to be any individual who is per-
sonally bona fide engaged primarily in farming operations or
the principal part of whose income is derived from farming
operations and includes the personal representatives of a de-
ceased farmer and the farmer is deemed a resident of any coun-
ty in which such farming operations occur. Under this sec-
tion the procedure is as follows:
Fifteen farmers from a county must petition the Court
for the appointment of "one or more referees, known as 'Con-
ciliating Commissioners' or to designate for service in such
county a 'Conciliatory Commissioner,' previously appointed
for an adjacent county, with the privilege in the Court in each
judicial district to appoint a 'Supervising Conciliation Com-
missioner,' " who would seem to have jurisdiction within the
judicial district, which, in this district, would be in the State
of Colorado-and only one of whom could be appointed.
His salary is fixed as not to exceed $5 per day and expenses.
The 15 farmers who file the petition setting the law in
motion, must each state that he wishes to file a petition under
the section to get an extension or composition.
This law further provides that the "Conciliatory Com-
missioner" shall not be eligible to appointment unless he is
eligible for appointment as a Referee; and in addition, is a
resident of the county, familiar with agricultural conditions
therein; not engaged in the farm-mortgage business or the
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business of financing farms; nor transactions in agricultural
commodities, or furnishing agricultural supplies.
When the farmer gets ready to file his individual peti-
tion, he pays a docket fee of $10, which is paid to the Clerk
of the Court and by him into the United States Treasury.
No other fee is charged to the farmer unless he agrees to have
his farming operations supervised. The object to be acquired
by the farmer is a composition of debts or an extension of
time for the payment on secured or unsecured debts, but the
composition or extension cannot reduce the amount or im-
pair the lien of any secured creditor, nor affect the allowances
and exemptions permitted debtors. Where a composition is
offered and accepted by the creditors, the money is distributed
under the direction of the "Conciliation Commissioners," all
claimants who file proofs of claim must present proof that
their claims are free of usury as defined by the laws of the
place where the debts are contracted.
The filing of a petition for relief under this section sub-
jects the farmer and his property, wherever located, to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court, and except upon a peti-
tion made and granted by the Judge, after a hearing and re-
port by the "Conciliation Commissioner" the following pro-
ceedings may not be maintained in any Court or otherwise
against the farmer or his property at any time after the filing
of the petition and prior to the confirmation or other disposi-
tion of the composition or extension proposed:
1. On any debt-demand or account;
2. Foreclosure on mortgage on land, cancellation of rescission
of specific performance for sale of land, or for recovery of possession
of land:
3. Proceedings to acquire tax titles;
4. Execution of attachments or garnishments;
5. To sell land under judgments or mechanics' liens:
6. Seizure, distress, sale or other proceedings under an execu-
tion, or under any lease, lien, chattel mortgage, conditional sales agree-
ment, crop-payment agreement, or mortgage.
In view of the absence of farming land in Denver Coun-
ty, this Act will probably not apply to the City and County
of Denver, as the residence of the farmer is presumed to be
the location of his land.
There is no provision under Section 75 for calling a
meeting of creditors, or for proceedings, except through the
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"Conciliation Commissioner." Referees in Bankruptcy do
not fit into the scheme, although the provisions as to the con-
firmation of compositions under it are similar to the bank-
ruptcy provisions; and the provisions as to confirmation are
that no order shall be entered under Section 75 adjudicating
a petitioner a bankrupt for non-compliance, except as pro-
vided "hereinafter in this section;" and as no provision of
this kind is "hereinafter" contained, the farmer who takes
advantage of this section cannot be adjudicated a bankrupt
under any circumstances.
When this section is put into operation, this Court may
have 63 Conciliators-and may have any number, with seg-
regated jurisdictions in each county, under which the farmer,
if he fails to comply with what he thinks he can do in the way
of paying his debts under extensions, will have no remedy
except to come back to the Old Bankruptcy Act which is in
effect and file his petition and be adjudicated a bankrupt and
be discharged from his debts, in the old-fashioned way.
Section 77 provides the means by which an insolvent
railroad corporation may effect a reorganization through the
Bankruptcy Court. The corporation itself may file a volun-
tary petition, setting out that it is insolvent and unable to
meet its debts as they mature and it desires to effect a plan
of reorganization. The petition is filed in the United States
Court; a copy is sent to the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion; a docket fee of $100 more than the regular bankruptcy
docket fee is paid and if it appears to the Court that the
petition is properly filed in good faith, an order is entered
approving the filing of that petition and thereafter the United
States Court in which the petition is filed and which must be
in the district where the principal executive office is, has ex-
clusive jurisdiction over the railroad company and all its
property, wherever situated.
An involuntary petition may be filed by creditors of the
corporation holding claims or interests aggregating 5 % of all
the indebtedness of the railroad, but before the involuntary
petition can be filed, permission must be obtained from the
Interstate Commerce Commission. Provision is provided for
the railroad company to file an answer and either admit or
deny the allegations in the petition and if the railroad com-
pany admits the allegations of the petition, or after trial, the
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Court finds that the petition is properly filed, proceedings are
taken in the same manner as if the corporation had filed a
voluntary petition.
Under this plan a reorganization may modify or alter
rights of creditors generally, secured or unsecured; may modi-
fy or alter the rights of stockholders, generally, of any class;
provide for the transfer or conveyance, with the consent of the
Interstate Commerce Act, of all or any part of the property
of the debtor to any other corporation or for consolidation
with another railroad corporation or merger and for the issu-
ance of securities.
Upon the approval of the petition, the judge of the
United States Court may appoint, from a panel of standing
trustees, who have been theretofore selected by the Interstate
Commerce Commission, a trustee and any such trustee so ap-
pointed shall have the power to operate the railroad under
the control of the judge. The compensation for the trustee or
trustees shall be the amount allowed within a maximum, ap-
proved by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
In case there is any matter to be passed upon by a
"Special Master,' the matter may be referred, upon the motion
of the court or request of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, to one of several "Special Masters" who have been previ-
ously designated to act as "Special Masters" by order of the
Circuit Court of Appeals. The Circuit Court of Appeals of
each circuit designates three or more members of the bar to
act as "Special Masters" to hear the matters referred to them
under this section.
The Judge of any District Court, or the trustee having
jurisdiction over railroads under this section, may not:
1. Change the wages or working conditions of railroad
employees, except in accordance with the Railroad Labor Act,
or as set forth in the agreement entered into January 21,
1932, between the executives of 21 standard labor organiza-
tions and the Committee of Nine, authorized to represent
class one railroads.
2. Deny in any way or in any way question the right
of employees to join the labor organization of their choice.
3. Use funds of the railroad to maintain so-called com-
pany unions or to influence or coerce employees in an effort
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to induce them to join or remain members of such company
unions.
4. Require any person seeking employment on any
such railroad to sign any contract or agreement promising to
join, or refusing to join a labor organization, or in the event
any railroad has such contract in force, as soon as the matter
is called to the attention of the judge, trustee or receiver, he
shall notify the employees by appropriate order that the con-
tract has been discarded and no longer binding on the em-
ployees.
This section is very complicated and has many pro-
visions which would be practically impossible to discuss in
an article of this length. It is interesting to note that the
patronage has been divided up between the United States Dis-
trict Court, the Interstate Commerce Commission and the
Circuit Court of Appeals.
DEBTOR'S EXEMPTIONS-BANKRUPTCY
Hon. Frank McLaughlin, referee in bankruptcy, recently
held that where Section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act provides
that the act shall not affect the right of a bankrupt to the
exemptions prescribed by state law, under the doctrine of
Klug vs. Corder, 82 Colo. 319, a bankrupt's truck used by
him as a means of livelihood and for no other purpose, was
exempt. Under the evidence the truck was held to be a farm
wagon, hence, exempt no matter what its value was. The
truck was of the value of $600 and there was a mortgage
against it sufficient to reduce this equity to about $200,
so that even if it had not been held to be a farm wagon and
its status fixed as a tool or implement of trade, it probably
would have been within the limitation of $200 as fixed by
our statute.
The decision was given in the case of Arthur Bruce Rob-
bins, bankrupt, Court No. 7585, Referee No. 3208.
Dicta congratulates the Ohio Bar Association Report on
the beginning of its sixth year. May it live long and prosper.
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ANNOUNCEMENT AND ADVERTISEMENT
The Editor is pleased to state (announcement) that a new source
of aged Colorado legal humor, or humor of a legal aspect, "has been
unearthed. This humor is laid at the door, as compiler and not author
we hope, of Richard Peete (advertisement). In case the other material
for this department already in the hands of the printer or lost some
place in the desk of the Editor-in-Chief shall be insufficient to fill the
two meagre pages afforded us, selected samples of said, humor will be
printed in this issue; otherwise, from time to time as long as the vein
holds out. Thank you very much, Mr. Peete (advertisement).
MORTUARY MIRTH; OR, DEAD HUMOR
G. Dexter Blount, Esq., is of opinion that what appears below
is funny. He-and we-are indifferent as to your opinion.
"On September 24, 1922, the plaintiff was living with her de-
ceased husband at 3008 Canal Street."
-Kelenic vs. Berndt, 185 Wis. 240.
GOOD OLD JEFFERSON COUNTY
George H. Lerg (Judge Lerg to you) shortly before mounting
the bench-January 5, 1933, to be exact, and we are always that-
advises us as follows (do not fail to observe the cautious way in which
the buck for accuracy is passed to the genial and kindly clerk of the
Jefferson District Court)
"Dear Ben (that's us) :
The following may interest you for your humorous page in Dicta
(Italics ours). It was given to me by Charles Pike a few days ago:
" 'Mr. Charles Pike, Clerk of the District Court in Jefferson Coun-
ty, Colorado, informs me that as soon as the gusty, cyclonic divorce
case of Wind vs. Wind had subsided, a new fistic combat of Schwatt
vs. Schwatt had been filed, to be refereed by Samuel W. Johnson, Judge
of the District Court.'
"These are actual cases filed, so I am told, and Mr. Pike can
verify them by reference to his docket record."
HARK TO THE SONG OF BOURQUIN, J.
Josiah G. Holland, Esq., delves into the mysteries of constitutional
law and emerges, breathless, with this in his teeth:
"Bourquin, District Judge: This case is somewhat unique in that,
believe it or not, plaintiff resists defendant's order to raise its rates. But
if madness, seems is method in it, the object, cut-throat competition
to a finish anticipated of a rival so lost to ethics as to poach upon plain-
tiff's preserves and underbid it, its attitude that in a restricted field
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wherein both cannot survive, if it must perish it will die fighting rather
than by slow starvation; and that it has an inalienable right of self-
preservation to lay on until the other first cries hold, enough, and flees
the field whether or not damned "
-Utilities Co. vs. Public Service Commission,
Public Utilities Reports, 1931 E, 2.
CONTRIBUTIONS PER DENISON, J.
I.
Scene: An examination in pleading.
Question: What is a negative pregnant?
Answer: A negative pregnant is an allegation asserting affirma-
tively or stating something in a negative way by affirming something
else, or vice versa.
Our view: What's wrong with that answer, Judge?
II.
Accompanying this contribution, which was received by an officer
of the Denver Bar Association and sent to us, was this note:
"Clark (that's us too) :
"Judge Denison sent this in. Not being able to tell whether it
is humorous or serious, or if serious, what it means; I think it belongs
to Dictaphun."
We will let you pass on the problem. Here they is:
"Lord Haldane, in Kreglinger vs. New Patagonia Company, Ltd.,
House of Lords, 1913:" . . .when a previous case has not laid down any new
principle but has merely decided that a particular set of facts illustrates
an existing rule, there are few more fertile sources of fallacy than to
search in it for what is simply resemblance in circumstances, and to
erect a previous decision into a governing precedent merely on this
account.
"The above is a proposition that lawyers and courts too often
forget or ignore."
Our view: That the serious thing about the contribution is that
the contributor is exactly right in believing that the facts surrounding
an accident at Sixteenth and Weltoxn Streets do not necessarily constitute
the law of negligence at that intersection.
CONVEYANCING, KANSAS STYLE
Henry A. Kugeler, Esq., who, may Heaven preserve him from this
folly, studies to be a lawyer, showed to us an agreement to convey
certain land in Shawnee County, Kansas. It appears to be a trade and
one of the parties solemnly covenants:
"The property of the said party of the first part shall be free of
all encumbrances, subject to a first mortgage of five thousand ($5,000)
dollars 5%, interest, due in 1936, also a mechanic lean in the sum of
$200 on new barn, on said farm also accrude interest, also present
tenant."
CONFLICT OF LAWS-CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACTS EXECUTED
IN FOREIGN STATES-ENFORCEMENT IN COLORADO AGAINST
ATTACHNG CREDITOR WITHOUT NOTICE-Commercial Credit
Company vs. Higbee-No. 12845-Decided March 20, 1933-
Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
1. Plaintiff in Error intervened in an attachment suit involving
an automobile, the petition of intervention alleging that the defendant
had purchased the automobile in California under a conditional sale
contract reserving title in the vendor, prohibiting the purchaser from
encumbering or permitting attachments to be levied against the prop-
erty, and prohibiting removal of the car from the state or California
without written consent of the vendor. The demurrer of the original'
plaintiff to the petition of intervention was sustained.
2. The courts of Colorado will not recognize the rights of a
vendor of an automobile or his grantee under a valid conditional sales
contract executed in California as against the rights of an attaching
creditor in Colorado who levies upon the automobile which has been
removed to Colorado without the permission or consent of the vendor
or his grantee.
3. Such a contract, although valid in the state where executed,
cannot be enforced against interested parties without notice in Colo-
rado, because such action would be contrary to public policy and would
result in detriment to the interests of a citizen of Colorado.
4. Secret liens reserved to the vendor of chattels in other states
will not be recognized against interested persons without notice in
Colorado.
5. The secret character of an unrecorded contract for conditional
sale of personalty, reserving title in the vendor, is against public policy
and contrary to the express provisions of the Statute of Frauds and
Perjuries in Colorado.--Judgment afflrmed.
AUTOMOBILES-CERTIFICATE OF TITLE-DUTY OF PURCHASER OF
NEW CAR-The Colorado State Bank vs. Riede-No. 12866-
Decided March 27,1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Moore.
1. Plaintiff brought replevin for automobile. Directed verdict
for defendant. Defendant purchased a new automobile and received
dealer's bill of sale, which he recorded on October 7, 1930. Seller, on
October 1, 1930, representing himself to be the owner, secured a loan
of $1,000 from plaintiff and gave chattel mortgage on automobile,
which was recorded October 2, 1930.
2. Upon the execution and delivery of a dealer's bill of sale for
a new automobile and delivery of car, the transfer is complete and
title passes to the purchaser.
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3. Section 3, Chap. 137, Session Laws of 1927, with reference
to certificate of title does not apply to cases of dealers selling new auto-
mobiles.
4. Where purchaser of new car purchases same in good faith and
receives bill of sale, a subsequent mortgagee cannot defeat the title of
the purchaser.--Judgment affirmed.
PERSONAL INJURIES-EXEMPLARY DAMAGES-RELATION TO COM-
PENSATORY DAMAGES-USE OF SPRING GUN -TO PROTECT
PROPERTY--Starkey vs. Dameron-No. 13118-Decided March
27, 1933-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
1. Plaintiff recovered judgment of $100 compensatory damages
and $2,000 exemplary damages for injuries sustained by discharge of
spring gun attached to gasoline pump outside of filling station, which
was an automatic pump, plaintiff claiming he had deposited his money
in pump and when it did not deliver, he attempted to get his money
out when he was injured by a spring gun which defendant had attached
to prevent theft of gasoline.
2. The installation of a spring gun to protect property against
theft is improper except in a domicil. The installation thereof in or
about buildings not a domicil, renders one liable for injuries sustained
by explosion thereof.
3. Exemplary damages awarded must have some reasonable re-
lation to compensatory damages. Where exemplary damages are awarded
in a sum twenty times the compensatory damages awarded, the award
will not be upheld.
Judgment reversed with directions that if plaintiff will consent
to modification of exemplary to an amount not exceeding compensatory
judgment awarded, judgment affirmed, otherwise new trial ordered as
to exemplary damages only.
CRIMINAL LAW-LARCENY-NEW TRIAL-NEWLY DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE-INSTRUCTIONS-Miller vs. The People-No. 13231
-Decided April 3, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
Archie Miller was convicted of larceny of a calf. He seeks reversal
of the sentence.
1. Application for a new trial based upon newly discovered evi-
dence is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and, unless
there has been an abuse of that discretion, an appellate court will not
interfere with the action of the trial court.
2. Newly discovered evidence going only to impeach the credit
or character of a witness is not sufficient ground for a new trial, except
it is clear that such impeachment would have resulted in a different
verdict.
3. The contentions that Miller's arrest and conviction were
brought about by a frameup is devoid of merit.
4. The ground that counsel appointed by the court presented
the case inefficiently at the trial is without merit.
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5. It is not reversible error to fail to give a cautionary instruc-
tion on accomplices where there was ample corroboration.
6. The instructions given were fair.
7. The contention that defendant was given a longer term of
imprisonment than the statute permits on the theory that he was only
an accessory after the fact is not tenable as the evidence showed that
the defendant was a principal and was punishable as such.-Judgment
afflrmed.-Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Hilliard dissent.
DEEDS - REFORMATION - PRORATION OF MORTGAGE LIABILITY
WHERE SEPARATE PARCELS COVERED BY MORTGAGE ARE CON-
VEYED-Hooper vs. The Capitol Life Insurance Co.-No. 12700
-Decided April 3, 1933-Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
Hooper owned five lots upon which there were two apartment
buildings subject to $14,000 mortgage to Capitol Life Insurance Com-
pany. Thereafter Hooper conveyed to James one of the apartment
buildings in exchange for a farm. The deed covenanted that the prop-
erty was free from encumbrance except the $14,000 mortgage, which
the grantee assumed. James thereafter borrowed from Gallup and gave
a trust deed on the apartment building that he had purchased. The
insurance company sued to foreclose the Hooper mortgage. James sought
reformation of the deed by cross complaint on the ground that the
assumption clause was placed in the deed without his knowledge and
contrary to the agreement of the parties. It appeared that the apartment
building was worth $15,000 and that the farm received in exchange
was worth $40,000 subject to $11,000 encumbrance, and that
the value of the other apartment building, retained by Hooper, was
$25,000. The court below reformed the deed and decreed that as be-
tween Hooper and James, the property deeded to James should bear
three-eighths and the property retained by Hooper would bear five-
eighths of the total mortgage debt.
1. To justify the reformation of the deed, the proof must be
clear, unequivocal and indubitable; a mere preponderance of the evi-
dence is not sufficient.
2. In this case, if it was true, as Hooper contends it is, that James
assumed and agreed to pay the entire encumbrance on both the prop-
erties that James acquired and the property retained by Hooper, namely,
a total of $14,000, he would be receiving for his $29,000 equity in
the farm only $1,000, which would mean a clear loss of $28,000. It
is highly improbable that anyone in his right mind would make such
an agreement. In view of this and other evidence, it is clear that the
written agreement for exchange of properties expressed the real intent
of the parties and that the assumption of mortgage clause was inserted
in the deed without the consent or knowledge of James.
3. The fact that a person accepts or signs an instrument with-
out reading the same is not of itself a conclusive barrier to a suit for
reformation. A grantee is not conclusively bound by an assumption
clause in a deed. He may show the real contract between the parties,
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though in contradiction of the assumption clause, and parol evidence
is admissible therefor.
4. Where an estate, subject to a mortgage, is conveyed by the
mortgagor in parcels at different times, and the mortgage debt is not
mentioned in a deed, such debt should be satisfied, first, out of that
portion of the estate retained by the mortgagor and then out of the
parcels aliened, in the inverse order of alienation.-Judgment affirmed.
TAXATION-DISTRAINT WARRANTS-DUTY OF SHERIFF TO SERVE
--J. W. Goldsmith vs. A. M. McAnally-No. 12915-Decided
April 3, 1933-Opinion by Mr. Justice Moore.
County Treasurer sought by mandamus to compel county sheriff
to serve a distraint warrant for the purpose of collecting delinquent
personal property taxes. The lower court held that sheriff was under
no legal duty to serve a distraint warrant and sustained the demurrer
and entered judgment of dismissal.
1. Under the statutes of Colorado, the sheriff is required to serve
all process, writs and orders, issued or made by lawful authority.
2. Under the statutes of Colorado, the county treasurer is au-
thorized to issue distraint warrant for collection of personal taxes, and
it is the duty of the sheriff to serve the distraint warrant.
3. A treasurer's distraint warrant is analogous to an execution.
4. A distraint warrant is a non-judicial process, precept or order,
made by lawful authority, and it is the duty of the sheriff to serve
and execute the same.-Judgment reversed.
CONSPIRACY - STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS - DEMONSTRATION IN
COURTROOM EXCESSIVE VERDICT--Clark et al. vs. Machette-
No. 12466-Decided April 3, 1933-Opinion by Mr. Justice
Campbell.
Plaintiff below recovered judgment for $2,500 against defendants
on eight different causes of action, in substance charging conspiracy to
injure plaintiff by unlawful searches, unlawful removal of her prop-
erty, unlawful arrest, and unfounded chazges of insanity.
1. Neither the 3-year nor the 1-year statute of limitations ap-
plied in this conspiracy case, although charged in eight different counts,
some of which was charged as occuring at the beginning of 1932, the
complaint stated in reality but one cause of action, namely, an executed
conspiracy which resulted in injury to the plaintiff.
2. Where the court rebukes spectators at a trial for demonstra-
tion, but the record does not disclose just what the demonstration was
and the defendants, at the time, make no suggestion to the court as to
the possibility of the remarks having a prejudicial effect on the defend-
ants, there was no error.
3. The verdict for $2,500 under the evidence was not excessive.
4. Judgment should be set aside as to defendant, Sam Gold-
hammer, as the evidence discloses he had no part in the conspiracy.-
Judgment affirmed in part and set aside in part.
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FIRE INSURANCE-LEASE WITH OPTION TO BUY-LOSS-LESSEE
ENTITLED TO INSURANCE-Dolan vs. Spencer-No. 13286-
Decided April 3, 1933-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Spencer owned land with improvements subject to $7,000 mort-
gage. Spencer leased the property to Dolan for three years with option
to purchase, providing that if Dolan paid taxes and interest on the
mortgage and by November 1, 1932, paid $1,000 and interest, he
was to have a warranty deed subject to the mortgage. The improve-
ments were worth $11,000 and were insured for $7,000. While con-
tract was in effect, improvements were destroyed by fire, and Dolan
demanded rebuilding, which was not done, and Spencer collected the
insurance. Dolan brought action against Spencer to recover for the loss.
Demurrer to complaint sustained, and judgment entered for Spencer.
1. The general rule is that under the facts above that the insur-
ance stands in lieu of the burned property and that the insurance money
goes to the purchaser.-Judgment reversed.
VERDICT - CONSISTENCY - BILL OF PARTICULARS - The Rocky
Mountain Fuel Co. vs. Betk-No. 12621-Decided April 10,
1933---Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Belk brought suit to recover $5,615.73 for services as detective.
Belk filed bill of particulars on order of court. Cause tried to a jury.
Jury found for Belk for $3,600. The evidence was sufficient to sup-
port a verdict either for the entire amount or for the sum admitted
and tendered by the defendant, but no possible view of the evidence can.
reconcile the evidence with the verdict for the sum of $3,600.
1. A verdict must be consistent with some legitimate theory of
the testimony, and where it is not, it should be set aside.
2. Neither the court nor the jury has any right to find for the
plaintiff in contradiction of his bill of particulars.--Judgment reversed.
WATERS-CHANGE IN POINT OF DIVERSION-The San Luis Valley
Irrigation District et al. vs. Knowlton-No. 12673-Decided
April 10, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
Knowlton brought action to change the point of diversion of his
irrigating ditch. The court below found that no substantial injurious
effect to the vested right of other water users in the district would
result from the change in point of diversion petitioned for and granted
the petition.
1. Where the vested rights of other water users in a district will
not be injured by the change of point of diversion of an irrigating ditch,
it is proper to change the point of diversion.
2. The fact that the court below found that no substantial in-
jurious effect to the vested rights of other water users would result from
such change cannot be urged on appeal where the court in another
part of its findings and decree declared that the changes asked for will
not injuriously affect the vested rights of other appropriators.-Judg-
ment affirmed.
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COMMON LAW TRUST-CONSTRUCTION-COMMISSIONS TO TRUS-
TEES-Todd us. Ford et at. and Wright, as Administrator, us.
Ford et al.-Nos. 12407 and 12408-Decided April 10, 1933-
Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
Certain certificate holders of a common law trust recovered judg-
ment below against the trustees of the common law trust for an ac-
counting. Accounting had and judgments in severalty were given
against defendants below.
1. A declaration of trust, which is mentioned in certificates
issued to certificate holders is binding upon the certificate holders or
unit holders.
2. Where no fraud or overreaching is shown the rights and
liabilities of all the parties to the trust, including unit holders and trus-
tees alike, must rest on the provisions of the declaration of trust.
3. Where the declaration of trust provides that trustees actively
engaged in administering the trust shall be reasonably compensated, they
are entitled to charge reasonable commissions for the sale of certificates
or units in the trust.--Judgment reversed.
REPLEVIN--STOCK CERTIFICATES-JOINDER OF OFFICER WITH
CORPORATON-Blackmer and The D. F. Blackmer Furniture &
Carpet Co. vs. Blackmer-No. 12929-Decided April 10, 1933
-- Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Mrs. Blackmer recovered judgment in replevin against the corpora-
tion and its president for certain certificates of capital stock.
1. Where the evidence concerning the ownership of certificates of
stock is conflicting, the weight and credibility thereof is for the lower
court to determine.
2. There is no inconsistency in joining both a corporation and
its president as defendants in a replevin action as they both may be
wrongfully withholding certificates of stock in their joint possession
and the evidence that such possession was so held by both the defend-
ants was clearly established.
3. By pleading over, any erroneous rulings on motions or de-
murrer, except as they relate to the objection of insufficiency of the
facts to constitute a cause of action, are waived.-Judgment affirmed.
SEPARATE MAINTENANCE-Blackmer vs. Blackmer-No. 13107-
Decided April 10, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Blackmer brought a suit for divorce in the court below. Answer
and cross complaint, praying for separate maintenance by defendant;
jury found for defendant on cross complaint, and judgment entered
thereon.
1. Where the evidence is conflicting and the record fails to show
that the presiding judge misconceived or misapplied the law, no pre-
judicial error is apparent. The judgment will be affirmed.--Judgment
affirmed.
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EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-CLAIM FOR SERVICES TO DE-
CEDENT-VALIDITY-Mitchell Vs. Sheets-No. 12858-Decided
April 17, 1933-Opinion by Mr. Justice Moore.
Clara Sheets, granddaughter of decedent, recovered a judgment
against the estate in the County Court based upon a claim for serv-
ices rendered as housekeeper and nurse for nine years prior to his death.
On appeal to the District Court, claim was allowed, and writ of error
prosecuted.
Decedent was aged, and at his request. his granddaughter came
from another state and acted as housekeeper and nurse for a period of
nearly nine years, upon a verbal agreement that if she would take care
of him, he would bear all her expenses and pay her well.
1. A defense to such a claim that the claimant was a member
of the family, and her services were rendered gratuitously, is an insuf-
ficient defense on the face of an express agreement for reimbursement
for services.-Judgment affirmed.
CRIMINAL LAW-INSANITY-EFFECT OF PLEA-ngles vs. The Peo-
ple-No. 13135-Decided April 17 1933--Opinion by Mr. Jus-
tice Butler.
Ingles was charged with murder, pleaded not guilty by reason of
insanity at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, was con-
victed of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death, and on writ
of error, judgment was reversed, and on new trial, defendant pleaded
not guilty and was again convicted of murder in the first degree and
sentenced to death. At the second trial, defendant sought to introduce
evidence tending to show that at the time of the homicide, he was in-
sane. The court sustained the state's objection holding that under the
Act of 1927 concerning pleas of insanity in criminal cases, such evi-
dence was not admissible, the defendant having withdrawn his former
plea of not guilty on the ground of insanity and substituted the general
plea of not guilty.
1. A statute providing that insanity shall not be a defense to a
criminal charge would be unconstitutional.
2. The purpose of the Act of 1927, Chapter 90, is to require
the defense of insanity to be tried only under a special plea. This de-
fense cannot be introduced under the plea of not guilty.
3. However, evidence of defendant's mental condition at the time
of the homicide is admissible under a plea of not guilty for the purpose
of reducing the grade of the crime from murder in the first degree to
murder in the second degree, and for the further reason that the jury,
having a discretion in first degree murder affixing the penalty of death
or imprisonment for life, such evidence is competent to go to the jury
in determining which penalty the jury shall inflict.
4. Where the state introduces evidence of a confession, such evi-
dence is admissible for the purpose of showing all the circumstances sur-
rounding the making of the confession.-Mr. Justice Bouck specially
concurs.-Judgment reversed.
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TAXATON-SUIT FOR RECOVERY OF ENTIRE TAX PAID-EXCESSIVE
TAXATON-Miller et at. vs. Board of County Commissioners et al.
-No. 12755-Decided April 17, 1933-Opinion by Mr. Jus-
tice Burke.
Plaintiffs below brought this action under Section 7447 Compiled
Laws, 1921, to recover certain taxes paid under protest on the ground
that the taxes were illegal in assessment and levy and deprived the tax-
ing authorities of jurisdiction. Judgment for defendants below.
1. Where the assessor increased valuation of property without
notice and without hearing, taxpayers' relief is confined to the tax
based upon the valuation "which the assessor added to the schedule."
2. But if a taxpayer is so deprived by his own neglect, he can
claim nothing.
3. There are two prerequisites to a suit under Section 7447
supra, that is, that the tax be paid and that it be erroneous or illegal.
4. Here the tax was neither erroneous nor illegal; if incorrect for
any reason, it was simply that it was excessive.
5. There is neither pleading nor proof in the instant suit that the
tax is either erroneous or illegal.
6. A taxpayer who seeks relief against an alleged overassessment
may have it only by affirmatively and clearly showing that it is mani-
festly excessive, fraudulent or oppressive.
7. Where a taxpayer expressly repudiates any claim to a refund
of the excessive tax and makes no demand save for a repayment of
the entire amount, and where it appears that the tax is neither erroneous
nor illegal, they are not entitled to relief.--Judgment affirmed.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-ORAL CONTRACT-EASEMENT-French vs.
Mitchell-No. 13284-Decided April 17, 1933-Opinion by
Mr. Justice Bouck.
Mitchell instituted suit against French to enforce specific perform-
ance of a contract for an easement for a right of way over lands. The
contract was oral. Mitchell claims it was taken out of the statute of
frauds by part performance. Judgment below for defendants.
1. The right of a party who has done acts in part execution of a
verbal contract for an easement or right of way over land to call upon
a court of equity to enforce it is subject to the restriction that his
position is such that an action at law for damages will not afford ade-
quate relief.
2. The acts relied upon must appear to have been done in pur-
suance of the verbal contract alleged.
3. It must be such an act done, as appears to the court would
not have been done, unless, on account of the agreement.
4. Where one seeks to enforce a verbal agreement for a right of
way across lands and it appears that it was not a way of necessity,
there being other means of ingress and egress, and it further appearing
that the only part performance of such verbal contract consisted of
the plaintiff building a line fence at a trivial expense, is not sufficient to
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take case out of the statute of frauds, and particularly is this true where
the buliding of such fence was primarily and originally, intended for
the natural protection and adornment of the plaintiffs' property.
5. Ifi order to take a verbal contract for an easement out of the
statute of frauds, the relation of the parties must be such that the loss
of improvements resulting from a failure to complete the agreement
would be an actual sacrifice on the part of the party seeking to en-
force it.
6. Where a complaint is grounded on a specific performance of a
verbal agreement for an easement and the trial court adopts tfiat theory,
it cannot be asserted that the action is an injunction suit in the appellate
court..--Judgment reversed.
ATTORNEYS-LIEN FOR SERVICES-PRIORITY BETWEEN THE AT-
TORNEY'S LIEN AND GARNISHMENT-EXTENT OF LIEN--Col-
lins vs. Thuringer-No. 12815-Decided April 20, 1933--Opin-
ion by Mr. Justice Butler.
First in point of time, W. R. Cline obtained judgment in the dis-
trict court against Edith Thuringer. Later, the same court rendered
judgment in favor of Edith Thuringer and against Charles W. Thur-
inger. W. Penn Collins acted as Edith Thuringer's attorney in the
latter case. The day after rendition of the latter judgment, Cline took
out execution and caused garnishment summons to be served on Charles
W. Thuringer, who answered that he was indebted to Edith Thuringer
on the prior judgment and the court rendered judgment against gar-
nishee; and subsequent to judgment against garnishee, Collins filed state-
ment claiming attorney's lien not, only for services in the latter case,
but including services in other matters. The court below decreed gar-
nishment judgment of Cline senior to the attorney's lien of Collins.
1. An attorney who obtains a judgment for his client has a
lien on the judgment for his fee in obtaining the same.
2. As between attorney and client, such lien is valid without
notice.
3. If a judgment debtor, without notice that the attorney in-
tends to enforce his lien, should make a bona fide settlement of the
judgment, or if an innocent third person, without such notice, should
purchase the judgment or acquire an interest therein, the attorney's
lien would be lost.
4. When the garnishment summons was served in the instant
case, such judgment was inferior to the attorney's lien.
5. A garnishment proceeding cannot displace prior valid and
bona fide existing rights and claims against the debt or property in-
volved.
6. An attorney's lien under Section 6010 and 6011, Compiled
Laws of 1921, is limited to a lien upon the judgment to secure the
payment of attorney's fees earned in matters concerning the judgment
and not for services rendered on other matters disconnected therewith.-
Judgment reversed.
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PLEADING-SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT-CHATTEL MORTGAGE-
LEASE-The D. F. Blackmer Furniture Company vs. Binghar-
No. 13288-Decided April 24, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Burke.
1. In consideration of a landlord's forbearance to assert his rent
lien on the furniture of a tenant, the furniture company warranted to
the landlord that it held a valid chattel mortgage which constituted a
prior lien on the furniture, and that if such warranty proved false it
would pay the landlord's claim. In an action against the company on
such warranty a complaint was defective which did not allege all the
facts necessary to show that such chattel mortgage was not a valid
prior lien at the time of the warranty.
2. Where the lease was originally made by a lessor other than
the plaintiff, the complaint must allege how plaintiff acquired an inter-
est therein so as to show that plaintiff had a right which he gave up
in consideration of defendant's warranty.--Judgment reversed with
directions.
CORPORATIONS-RECEIVER-REMOVAL OF-ESTOPPEL-LACHES-
FRAUD-Thompson et af. vs. Beck-No. 12713-Decided April
24, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
1. Participation and acquiescence by stockholders in plans for
reorganization of a corporation in receivership estops them from later
objecting to the actions of the receiver in carrying out such plans.
2. Rule XVIII of the Supreme Court affords a ready method
of review of action taken to secure the receiver's discharge. Stockhold-
ers, who for years had opportunity to resort to such method, are guilty
of laches for failure to do so.
3. Fraud must be pleaded with definiteness and certainty, and
proved as pleaded. Inferences and conclusions of the pleader cannot
be substituted for allegations of fact.
4. Where the appointment of a receiver was intended to afford
a speedy determination of the corporate affairs, continuance of the re-
ceivership for eight years disapproved.-Judgment affirmed.
DICTA
BAR ASSOCIATION
The secretary of the Bar Association was very busy and
rather cross. The telephone rang.
"Well, what is it?" he snapped.
"Is this the city gas works?" said a woman's soft voice.
"No, madam," roared the secretary, "this is the San
Francisco Bar Association."
"Ah," she answered in the sweetest of tones, "I didn't
miss it so far, after all, did I?"
Charles Mathews, who in his younger days knew what it
was to be very much worried with debts, once met a friend
who asked him if he could spare him 10s. to help bury a
bailiff. "Certainly," replied Mathews, "here's a sovereign,
bury two."
DUELLING
A southern Missouri man recently was tried on a charge
of assault. The State brought into court, as the weapons
used, a rail, an axe, a pair of tongs, a saw, and a rifle. The
defendant's counsel exhibited, as the other man's weapons, a
scythe blade, a pitchfork, a pistol, and a hoe. The jury's
verdict is said to have been: "Resolved, That we, the jury,
would have given a dollar to have seen the fight."
EVIDENCE
"You look sweet enough to kiss," says the impressed
man.
"So many gentlemen tell me that," coyly answers the
fair girl.
"Ah! That should make you happy."
"But they merely say that," she replies. "They merely
tell me the facts in the case and never prove their statements."
Lawyer: "How do you know that this man was given
to talking to himself when he was alone?"
Witness: "Shure, haven't Oi been wid him time and time
again when he did it?"
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